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We analyze the impact of organizational form on the incentive of market participants to collect
value relevant information about divisions of the firm. We explore whether the market collects
less information about divisions of a multi division firm relative to the case in which each division
trades as a separate firm. We find that organizational form has a non trivial impact on information
collection. In particular, we find that a spinoff may lead to either an increase or a decrease in
aggregate information collection. We explore how this result affects firm value and find the conditions
under which a spinoff increases and decreases firm value. Our results provide a novel rationale for
why firms may choose to spinoff a division or issue a tracking stock.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long been interested in understanding the impact of organizational
form on internal resource allocation.1 This relates to the broader and more fundamental
question of determining the optimal size and scope of the firm by identifying the costs
and benefits associated with having economic transactions (in this case the allocation of
resources) done within the boundary of the firm. In this paper we wish to extend the analysis
of the impact of organizational form on resource allocation. However, unlike previous work
we are interested in shifting the focus from internal resource allocation to external resource
allocation. Namely, we wish to explore the impact of organizational form on the decision
of market participants to allocate their resources for the purpose of collecting information
about the investments of divisions within the firm and find out how these decisions affect
firm value.
The general belief in the market can best be summarized with the following quote from
an article, taken from the 2001 September 14 issue of the Wall Street Journal, which talked
about the 3Com-Palm spinoff, “Analyst Paul Sgawa... said 3Com is worth more as two
pieces than as one. ‘I think it’s unlocking value for shareholders’, he said.” In other words
the view among practitioners is that spinoffs increase the amount of information in the
market and hence increases firm value by bringing stock prices closer to their intrinsic
value. Our goal in this paper is to take a rigorous look at this issue.
In practice we see that firms issue tracking stocks (see for example AT&T), engage in
mergers, and spin off divisions. These actions are, at least in part, motivated by the firm’s
wish to make its core business more easily understood by the market. Our paper can then
shed some new light on the possible costs and benefits of these activities.
1See for example Harris and Raviv(1996), Stein(1997), and Scharfstein and Stein(2000).
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The questions which we address in the paper may best be understood with the example
of 3Com corporation’s recent decision to spin off its Palm Pilot division. This division is
now trading as a separate firm called Palm. We ask whether the decision of (potentially)
informed traders in the market to collect information about Palm are different now when
Palm is trading as a separate company relative to their decision earlier when Palm was a
division of 3Com.2 Furthermore, we ask whether the decision to collect information about
Palm when it was a division of 3Com was related to the economic characteristics of 3Com’s
other divisions or whether it was independent of them. In other words if Palm was a division
of IBM would the amount of information produced by the market regarding Palm’s future
prospects have been different? Finally, we ask what are the conditions under which a spinoff
will increase the value of the firm?
Understanding the markets incentive to collect information is important for several
reasons. In our paper we focus on the role of information in getting stock market prices to
move closer to their true (future) value. However, there are other reasons (not explicitly
studied in this paper) why informative stock prices may affect firm value. First, stock prices
that are informative about future value can help the allocation of resources in the economy.3
Second, since stock prices are used in compensation contracts to motivate managers, less
informative stock prices will provide very low powered incentives which can potentially lead
to bad investment decisions and a reduced or discounted firm value.4
2Note that our focus is on the long run incentive to collect information. In the short term, following
a spin off, there are several trading restrictions that may prevent informed investors from trading on their
information.
3Dow and Gorton(1997) show how informative stock prices can be used by managers to make better
investment decisions. Subrahmanyam and Titman(1999) relate the efficiency of stock prices to the develop-
ment of the capital market.
4See Holmstrom and Tirole(1993) for a recent analysis of the monitoring role of stock based compensation.
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To address these issues we compare a situation in which the market consists of one multi
(two) division firm to a situation in which each of the firm’s divisions trade as single division
firms. In general, we find that organizational form has a non trivial impact on the amount
of information produced/collected by the market and hence on how informative is the stock
price regarding the future value of the firm. Perhaps surprisingly, however, we find that
following a spinoff (or the creation of a tracking stock) the amount of information produced
in the market does not always rise. Rather, holding the total amount of liquidity trades
fixed across the two scenarios, we find that spinoffs result in an increase in information
collection about one part of the spun off firm and a decrease in information collection about
the other part. In sum, a spinoff results in an aggregate increase in information collection
only when the divisions have investment sets that have relatively similar Sharpe ratios.
Put differently, we find that the likelihood that a spinoff increases aggregate information
collection in the market is strictly less than one. This likelihood is higher the smaller the
difference between the Sharpe ratios of the investment sets of the two divisions.
The above result implies that the conditions under which a spinoff will increase firm
value are more complex then previously thought. A spinoff does not result in an increase
in information production about all of the firms assets. Hence, we find that it will increase
firm value when it leads to an increase in information production about the part of the firm
(division) that is under valued and/or a decrease in information production about the part
of the firm that is over valued. This result fits well with the recent empirical work of Allen
(2001). In his study he finds that when insiders are net sellers of shares during the first
few month following a spinoff the firm has subsequently poor market performance whereas
when insiders are net buyers the subsequent performance is positive. While Allen focuses
on the predictive power of insider trading following a spinoff his evidence is consistent with
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our story that a spinoff can be motivated both by having an under valued asset (division)
and by having an over valued one. Other models (see discussion below) which assume that
information production increases after a spinoff cannot explain why a spinoff should take
place when some divisions are over valued (i.e., they have subsequent negative performance).
The key to understanding our result is the observation that the optimal amount of
(costly) information that is collected in the market depends on the benefit to market par-
ticipants from trading on their information. There are two main reasons why the incentive
to collect information is different for those who trade in the stock of a multi division firm and
those who trade in the stocks of single division firm. First, the stock price of a single division
firm will only reflect information about the investments made by that division whereas a
stock price of a multi division firm will typically incorporate information about all divisions
that are within the boundary of that firm. Hence, in a multi division firm information
about one division is less valuable because that division constitutes a smaller part of the
value of the firm’s stock price. Namely, when the informed trader learns about the future
value of investments of one division, since she trades on this information using a security
whose price is also influenced by investments made by other divisions, her trading profits
from collecting information about that division go down. The magnitude of the reduced in-
centive will typically depend on the relative size and riskiness of the division as it relates to
the firm’s other divisions. Second, in the multi division firm the informed trader, regardless
of her information, trades against the “liquidity traders of the whole firm”. However, when
the two divisions separate the informed trader trades on her “division i information” only
against “division i liquidity traders”. Thus, information about division i is more valuable
in a multi division firm because the informed traders trades have a smaller impact on the
stock price. The equilibrium of the model trades off these two competing effects.
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It is important to point out that we derive these results without specifying exogenously
an informational advantage or disadvantage to one organizational form over the other.5
Rather we show that if a similar technology can be used to learn about a division, regard-
less of whether it is a unit of a big firm or if it is a separate entity, it is the strategic
choice of market participants to produce different amounts of information, depending on
the organizational form, which generates all of our results.
Our paper is based on the literature which deals with information aggregation in stock
prices.6 We take the modeling framework of Kyle(1985) and build on it to analyze the stock
price of a multi division firm. Other related papers which allow for endogenous information
collection include Subrahmanyam(1991), Chowdhry and Nanda(1991), and Admati and
Pfleiderer(1988). Although our paper focuses on a different aspect of information collection
Subrahmanyam(1991) and Gorton and Pennachi (1993) have some similarities to us in that
they analyze the benefits of trading a basket of securities. Unlike our paper however they
allow for simultaneous trading in both the index and the individual security and analyze
where traders will go. In contrast in this paper investors cannot trade the stock of the multi
division firm at the same time as they trade in the single division firms since both scenarios
are mutually exclusive. In this sense our results relate more closely to a corporate change
in the boundary or structure of the firm.
One can view our analysis of spinning off a division as a question of security design.
While there is a vast and growing literature on security design7 our paper is closest to
5Habib, Johnson and Naik(1997) assumes that a spinoff results in more informative prices. We on the
other hand allow for information collection to be an endogenous choice variable.
6For the fundamental papers on the aggregation of information in stock prices see Grossman(1976),
Grossman and Stiglitz(1980), Hellwig(1980), and Kyle(1985).
7See for example Allen and Gale(1988, 1991), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999)
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security design which is motivated by informational issues.8 In that regard our paper is
similar to that of Boot and Thakor (1993). They study how the mix of securities issued
by the firm affect the amount of information collected by the market. They focus on two
securities, one that is informationaly sensitive, a stock, and one that is informationaly in-
sensitive, a bond. We on the other hand inherit our security design structure from the
corporate structure of the firm (namely its divisions). Our focus is on whether having two
informationaly sensitive securities, one for each division, is better than having one security
for both.
Finally, our paper also relates to the literature on spinoffs. Aron(1991) demonstrates
how a spinoff can improve the incentive contracts written with divisional managers. Habib
et al.(1997) show that if a spinoff increases information in stock prices it may lead to
better investment decisions by managers. Unlike these two papers we show that, when
information collection is endogenous, a purely informational story is sufficient to explain
when firms would want to spinoff divisions and when they would not. Namely, we show
that even when a spinoff does not affect the compensation package of divisional managers or
their investment decisions a spinoff can still increase firm value. Thus, our paper generates
fairly distinct empirical predictions about the optimality of a spinoff. As mentioned above
these seem to be consistent with the new findings in Allen(2001).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model. In
Sections 3 and 4 we analyze the economy with single and multi division firms respectively.
In Section 5 we compare the two scenarios and discuss the economic interpretation of the
differences between them. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are left to the appendix.
8See Gorton and Pennacchi (1993), Subrahmanyam (1991), and Boot and Thakor (1993).
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2 Model Economy
We start off with two investment projects which are organized as two separate divi-
sions. The two divisions can either be organized under the roof of one multi division firm
or alternatively as two separate single division firms. All firms are assumed to be financed
through public equity traded in the open market. Each division receives, at t = 0, an initial
capital investment αi for i = 1, 2. These investments produce, at t = 1, profits of αiVi for
division i. Vi denotes the realized return on the project. We make the following assumption
about the stochastic properties of returns,
Assumption 1 Vi, is distributed Vi ∼ N(µi, σ2i ) for i = 1, 2 and Cov(V1, V2) = 0.
At the initial date, t = 0, the market does not know what the future return of each
project will be. However, there exist an informed trader who can collect information about
these projects. Namely, she has a costly technology which allows her to learn about the
future profitability of each project. In particular she receives two signals, one on each
project, where the amount of information contained in each signal depends on the amount
of resources that she puts into getting it. After receiving these signals the informed trader
submits a market order for the relevant traded stock(s).
In what follows we describe the model in more detail assuming the two divisions operate
as two separate firms.9
2.1 Stock Market
The stock market consists of an informed trader, a continuum of uninformed liquidity
traders, and a risk neutral market maker.
9We postpone the description of the case of a multi division firm to Section 4. In that section we will
discuss how the modeling features change to allow for a fair comparison to the base case above.
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The informed trader submits an order for Xi shares of firm i based on her information.
In contrast the liquidity traders cannot produce information and are subject to a random
liquidity shock. In aggregate they submit a random order of Ui for shares of Firm i where
Ui ∼ N(0, σ2ui) and Ui is independent of all other random variables. The market maker
observes the aggregate demand for each firm, Yi = Xi + Ui, and selects a price, Pi(Yi). We
assume that the market maker operates in a competitive market so that he sets prices equal
to the expected value of future profits conditional on all available market information. The
resulting price then satisfies,
Pi(Yi) = E(αiVi|Yi,Ω) (1)
Here Ω denotes the market makers information set at t = 0 excluding the information
contained in the net order flow, Yi. In particular Ω includes information about all model
parameters except for the future return, Vi, and the private signals of the informed trader,
Si. The modeling of the stock market is closely related to that of Kyle(1985).
2.2 Informed Trader
The informed trader is assumed to be risk neutral. Her information set at t = 0
includes the firms’ initial investment decision, α1 and α2 as well as the parameters of the
distributions of the payoffs of each division µ1, σ21 and µ2, σ
2
2 . However, she does not know
the actual future returns of the divisions, V1 and V2. For this reason she engages in costly
information production. We assume that the informed trader has to expend resources in
order to receive a signal about the return of each of the two divisions. Specifically, we
assume that,
Assumption 2 The informed trader invests 0 ≤ ei ≤ 1 and receives a signal
Si = Vi − µi + εi(1−eiei )0.5 where εi ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and E(εiVi) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
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The interpretation of the assumption is that the informed trader receives a separate signal




producing information about division i increases the accuracy of the signal by decreasing
its variance. In the extreme case if the informed trader does not put any resources into
collecting the signal Si then the signal she gets is completely uninformative (i.e., σsi = ∞).
If on the other hand she puts in the maximum amount of resources into learning about
division i (ei = 1) the signal becomes fully informative in the sense that Si = Vi − µi. In
general the more resources put into learning about division i, the more informative is the
signal she receives.10
We further assume that obtaining information is costly,
Assumption 3 The cost of producing information about Firm i is 12cie
2
i .
The informed trader collects information on each firms division and then submits a market
order to purchase X1(S1), and X2(S2) shares of Firm 1 and Firm 2 respectively. These mar-
ket orders are chosen strategically so as to maximize her expected trading profits, π(S1, S2).
To summarize the model Table 1 provides the sequence of events.11
10Note that V ar(Vi|Si) = σ2i (1 − ei). Hence, as will be seen in Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 the benefit of
collecting information will increase with σi. This is because the market makers uncertainty about the future
value of each project is σi.
11All of the main results of the paper can be derived in an analogous model in which there are multiple
informed traders who compete with each other. In that model each trader can spend a fixed amount, ei, on
getting a signal, Si, about either Division 1 or Division 2. In equilibrium we solve for the number of traders
who choose to become informed about Division 1 and about Division 2. The derivation of the equilibrium
in this setting is available upon request.
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3 Single Division Firms
In this section we solve for the information collected by the market when the two
divisions trade as two separate firms. We will use the results here as a benchmark to which
we can compare the case in which the two divisions merge into one multi division firm.
3.1 Equilibrium
The following is the definition of the equilibrium,
Definition 1 The Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the game played by the market
maker and the informed trader consists of,
(i)An optimal amount of information produced by the informed trader, and an optimal
demand for the stocks of each firm based on the information she gets.
(ii) A stock price for each firm which is a function of the market maker’s information set
and which provides him with an expected profit of zero.
We solve the equilibrium using backward induction. In the first step we solve for the
stock prices and the demand functions of the informed trader conditional on her information
production decision. In the second step we solve for the informed trader’s optimal amount
of information production.12
The Lemma below provides the stock prices and the optimal demand function of the
informed trader when we condition on the amount of information being produced in the
market.
12The equilibrium derived here is similar to an equilibrium where the market maker and the informed
trader simultaneously choose the price function and the amount of information to collect, respectively, as a
function of what the other player does and then finding the Nash equilibrium Pi and ei.
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Lemma 1 The equilibrium price function is given by Pi = αiµi + λiYi


















Lemma 1 is a simple extension of Kyle(1985) for the case in which the informed trader
receives a noisy signal about future returns. Here, λi is a function of σsi and hence will
be affected by the endogenous choice of information production (i.e., a function of the
endogenous decision variable ei).
Using Lemma 1 we can proceed to solve for the informed trader’s optimal information
production. However, we first need to derive the informed trader’s expected revenue from
her trading activity. This is provided by the lemma below.
Lemma 2 The informed trader’s expected revenue from trading on her information, de-



















for i = 1, 2.
Proof: See Appendix.
The expected revenue is the sum of the revenue generated from trading in Firm 1’s stock
based on the information collected on that firm’s project and the revenue generated from
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trading in Firm 2’s stock based on the information collected on Firm 2’s project. Note that
the expected profit is decreasing in the variance of the signals and therefore is increasing in
the amount of information collected, e1 and e2.
To complete the calculation of the equilibrium we solve below the optimization problem











Lemma 3 The optimal amount of information the informed trader collects about the single









The amount of information produced about Firm i’s project increases with the amount of
capital allocated (internally) to it, αi, and with the project return volatility, σ2i . It also
decreases with the parameter for the cost of producing information, ci. Not surprisingly it
is only a function of the economic parameters of the firm’s investment and does not depend
on anything that the other firm does.
4 Multi Division Firm
In this section we study a multi division firm that has the same investment set as
the two single division firms from the previous section. The question we wish to address
is whether the new organizational form leads to a change in the amount of information
produced in the market.13 In order to make a fair comparison of the two economies we need
13It is important to note that we do not attempt to provide here a complete theory of mergers and spinoff.
Admittedly, our goal is merely to provide one additional piece of the big puzzle. We wish to highlight one
aspect of organizational form which is the incentive it creates for outsiders to produce information about
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to assume that the amount of liquidity in the market is constant across the two scenarios.
Specifically, we assume that,
Assumption 4 The variance of liquidity traders in the multi division firm, σ2u is equal to
σ2u1 + σ
2




U where z1 + z2 = 1. One can interpret z1 as a
random variable distributed between zero and one.14
We will later refer to z1 as z and z2 as 1− z.
In addition to the above assumption we have,
Assumption 5 The informed trader gets the same signals, S1 and S2 as before.
The only difference between the two cases then is in that the informed trader now has
one equity security which she can use to make her trades. Unlike the previous case where
she was able to trade on her information in two securities, one for each single division firm,
here there is one security which aggregates all the information about both divisions.
The Lemma below describes the equilibrium price and demand of the informed trader.
Lemma 4 The equilibrium price function is given by P = µ + λY where
Y = X(S1, S2) + U is the aggregate demand for the firm’s stock and where µ and λ are











internal projects. In that sense we do not capture many of the important elements that may be associated
with multi division firms such as better/worse internal resource allocation, better/worse coordination and
greater/smaller agency problems. We hope, however, that restricting our attention to the current issues may
still provide valuable insight.
14We follow the literature by assuming that liquidity traders are non strategic. As will be shown below
our results hold for any value of zi.
13












From Lemma 4 we can see the impact of having two divisions inside one firm. Since
there is only one traded security the market maker selects a price function which aggregates
all available information regarding both divisions into one price. For this reason the market
depth parameter λ is now a function of α1 and σs1 as well as of α2 and σs2. In addition,
the demand function of the informed trader is linear and additive in both signals S1 and
S2. For a given signal Sj the higher is her signal Si the higher will be her demand for the
stock.
Lemma 5 The informed trader’s expected revenue from trading on her information,
denoted by πM (e1, e2), is given by,















As before, the expected profits are decreasing in the variance of the signal and therefore
increasing in the amount of information produced. More interesting perhaps is the impact
of collecting information about one division on the informed traders total expected trading
profits. Unlike the single division setting, here the profit function is no longer additively
separable in the trading profits generated from each signal. From equation 8 we see that











. Due to the fact that both divisions are traded under one security these two terms are
no longer additively separable.
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To solve for the informed trader’s information production decision we maximize
max
e1,e2






























Lemma 6 The informed trader’s optimal allocation of resources when producing informa-





















where A = α21σ
2






Lemma 6 completes the equilibrium. Combined with Lemma 3 this lemma is the key
to understanding the main results of the paper. In the Corollary below we explore the
implications of Lemma 6.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium amount of information collected about division i, eMi , is in-
creasing in the size of capital investment in division i, αi, and the volatility of its profits,
σ2i .
Intuitively, if the division gets more funds it will represents a larger part of the total firm
and therefore will have a bigger impact on the stock price. In that case it becomes more
critical for whoever wants to trade in the stock to learn about the operation of that division.
The reason why the informed trader also collects more information if the division invests
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in projects with a higher volatility of future revenue is because higher volatility results in
higher uncertainty for the whole market (i.e., the market maker and the uninformed trader).
Since the informed trader is competing against the market maker the value of becoming
informed about something which the market is more uncertain about will generate higher
average trading profits. This means that there is a greater benefit to the informed trader
from reducing her uncertainty by increasing the accuracy of the signal she gets.15
Corollary 2 The amount of information production regarding division i depends on the
economic characteristic of other divisions within the boundary of the firm, namely division
j = i. Specifically, information acquisition eMi decreases with αj and σ2j .
Corollary 2 demonstrates one aspect of the impact of organizational form on the decision
to collect information about a division of the multi division firm. The difference between
the results here and the results in Lemma 3 highlight the impact of the boundary of the
firm on the markets incentive to collect information. Here, since both divisions trade under
the umbrella of one firm there is one security which aggregates all available information.
In practical terms this means that trading on information regarding both Divisions 1 and
2 is done against the liquidity traders of the whole firm (ı.e., σu). Therefore, the incentive
to produce information about one division depends on how big it is relative to the other
division and on how volatile its profits are relative to the other division. In particular, if αj
goes up the relative impact of the outcome of division i’s project on the performance of the
stock goes down. This in turn reduces the incentive to collect information about division
i. Hence eMi goes down. Similarly, if σj goes up the volatility of the stock price associated
with division j’s profits goes up too. In that case the relative value of gathering information
about division i goes down. In essence then the link between information collection about
15Note that the last result is strongly related to the assumed structure of the signal (Assumption 2).
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one division and the other is due to the fact the informed trader faces a joint liquidity
constraint when she trades based on the two sources of information she gets.
5 Single Versus Multi Division Firm
In this section we analyze the differences between the equilibrium amount of informa-
tion collected in the two economies, the magnitude of these differences and their economic
implications. The variables we use to compare across the two economies are the total
amount of information produced in the market, the volatility of prices, and firm value.
To flush out the economic interpretation of the results we will assume for sake of con-






so that αi = µiσ2i
for i = 1, 2.16
While not critical to the analysis we assume for notational simplicity that c1 = c2. Also
it will be convenient to define µ1σ1 = βG and
µ2
σ2
= 1βG. Note that β captures the level
of divergence between the investment opportunity sets of the two divisions. When β = 1
the divisions have investment sets which have the same Sharpe ratios while for β = 1 the
investment sets diverge (symmetrically). Finally, we assume with out loss of generality that
β > 1. This is equivalent to the assumption that the investment set of Division 1 is better
than that of the other division.
Most of the intuition for the comparisons will come from the following relationship which
16While it is true that divisional investment may change depending on whether the division is part of a
multi division firm or not we ignore this issue in the current paper. Instead we focus on changes that are
purely due to changes in market information production.
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Equation 11 shows the relationship between the amount of information collected about
a division when it is part of a multi division firm and the amount of information collected
about the same division when it trades as a separate firm.
























= 1 and since z1 + z2 = 1



































4 + (µjσj )
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This means that following a spinoff (or prior to a merger) organizational form does
matter for information collection. Typically, a spinoff results in an increase in the amount
of information produced about one division and a decrease in the amount of information
produced about the other division. For a given level of liquidity distribution, z, which of
the two divisions will see an increase in information collection will depend on how different
the investment sets of the two divisions are (i.e., how different are their Sharpe ratios).
The question left open is what is the impact of the change of organizational form on
aggregate levels of information production, volatility of stock prices, and firm value. This is
the focus of the propositions below.
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Proposition 1 For any liquidity distribution z there exists a level of diversity β∗(z) such
that for β > β∗(z) a spinoff will decrease the aggregate amount of information production
and for β < β∗(z) a spinoff will increase information production. For β = β∗(z) information
production does not change following a spinoff.
Proof of Proposition 1





































3 ]. Replacing A with (βG)2 and B with ( 1βG)
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Proposition 1 shows that a spinoff does not always increase the aggregate amount of
information being produced in the market. Rather, we see that for any distribution of
liquidity, z, spinoffs will result in more information production if and only if the two divisions
have investment sets whose Sharpe ratios are not too different.
The intuition is based on the observation that the value from trading on information
increases with both the liquidity level and with the Sharpe measure of each division (see
Lemma’s 3 and 6). With two firms the amount of information collected about each firm is
(roughly speaking) proportional to its Sharpe measure and to its stock liquidity. Since the
total amount of liquidity is fixed the more liquidity going to the firm with the high Sharpe
measure the higher will be the aggregate amount of information produced in the market.
With a multi division firm information about each division is also proportional to its
divisional Sharpe measure. But here it is proportional to the liquidity of the whole firm.
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This is the benefit of collecting information about a multi division firm. However, due to
the confounding impact of each division on the profit from collecting information about
the other, the information collected on each division decreases by the ratio of the divisions
Sharpe measure to the sum of the Sharpe measures of all divisions. Thus, the more diversity
in Sharpe measures the higher is the aggregate amount of information collected in this
case. If then the divisions are sufficiently diverse the benefit of having greater liquidity will
dominate the negative impact of having two sources of information in one stock price.
The intuition above is at the basis of all the analysis to follow. Hence, it is worth re-
peating the key differences in the incentive to collect information between the two scenarios.
In the multi division firm the incentive to collect information is decreased because in order
to gain from having information about one division you have to trade in a stock that also
reacts to the returns from the other division. However, the incentive to collect information
is increased because the liquidity of the stock is higher. The opposite holds for the single
division firm. Here, there is no confounding information from the other division but there
is less liquidity to trade against.
To be concrete, if a small IT company was to merge with Microsoft the increased liquidity
that this firm will get when being part of Microsoft may outweigh the fact that it is now
a small part of a big corporation. Hence, the merger may result in more information
production in the market.
If one considers the liquidity trades, z, as being a random variable then the result above
has a natural empirical implication: One is more likely to see a spinoff that results in an
increase in information production whenever the difference between the investment sets of
the two divisions is smaller.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the general perception that spinoffs always increase
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information is not correct. We show that both a merger and a spinoff can result in an
increase in information. The equilibria in which multi division firms can have a stock price
that contains more information about future value might explain why many firms choose
not to spinoff divisions. Also, these equilibria offer a rationale for why firms choose not to
issue tracking stocks which, on the face of it, seem to be a good idea. The equilibria of
our model demonstrate that issuing a tracking stock does not always increase information
collection. In particular, if the tracking stock attracts too much of the liquidity away from
the main firm, or if the Sharpe ratios of investments are sufficiently different, the issuance
can result in a loss of information.17
Below we analyze what happens to the unconditional volatility of the stock price.
Corollary 3 The volatility of the stock price, P , and Pi, of the multi and single division
firm is given by,






















respectively. Hence, the stock market is more volatile following a spinoff if and only if the
condition in Proposition 1 above holds.
5.1 Firm Value
In this section we explore the conditions under which a spinoff will result in a higher
firm value. To analyze the value of the firm we assume that after making the investment
17Note that in the context of our model spinoffs are in essence equivalent to issuing a tracking stock for
one of the two divisions. This is because our spinoff does not involve any change in the divisions production
function. Thus, one can also view our paper in the context of the literature on security design.
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decision the manager observes V1 and V2 and based on this she decides whether to spinoff
a division. In addition, we assume that
Assumption 6 The informed trader makes her trading decision only based on her noisy
signals, Si and not based on the spinoff decision of the manager.
This assumption simplifies the complexity of the equilibrium by allowing us to ignore
the potential signaling effect of the organizational choice. While this assumption may be
problematic we believe that it does not change the main intuitions provided below.18
We can now turn to calculate the expected value of the firm from the managers per-
spective. When both divisions trade as a multi division firm the expected price of the firm,
conditional on V1 and V2 is
E(P (Y )|V1, V2) = α1µ1 + α2µ2 + 12α1e
M





2 (V2 − µ2) (14)
The expected price is calculated based on the equilibrium price function given in Lemma 4.
When the two divisions trade as two separate firms the sum of their expected values is,
E(P1(Y1)|V1) + E(P2(Y2)|V2) = α1µ1 + α2µ2 + 12α1e
s





2(V2 − µ2) (15)
This calculation is based on the equilibrium values in Lemma 1. Looking at equations 14
and 15 it is clear that when information production is assumed to be a constant exogenous
number the expected values under both scenarios are the same. Therefore the difference
in value between the spinoff and the non-spinoff cases will be, again, due to endogenous
information production.
18In a somewhat similar setting Boot and Thakor(1993) solve for a pooling equilibrium by assuming that
the value of the firm has a bimodal distribution. Since we have two divisions whose values are normally
distributed the signaling model that they look at becomes intractable here.
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Proposition 2 For any distribution of liquidity trades z there exists a constant β∗(z) such
that for β > β∗(z) a sufficient condition for spinoffs to be non-profitable is that, V1 > µ1
and that V2 < µ2. Further a sufficient condition for spinoffs to be profitable is that, V1 < µ1
and that V2 > µ2. The opposite holds for β < β∗(z).
Proof: See Appendix
A spinoff may or may not increase the value of the firm. If the Sharpe ratios of the two
divisions are sufficiently diverse a spinoff increases value when the (future) return of the
division with the higher Sharpe measure is below its expected return and the (future) return
of the other division is above its expected return. The reason being that for β > β∗(z) a
spinoff will result in a decrease in information production about Division 1 and an increase
in information production about Division 2. Less information about Division 1 is valuable
when the true return V1 is lower than the expected return µ1 and more information is
valuable when V2 is greater than µ2.
The intriguing aspect of a spinoff is that it does not result in an increase in information
production about all divisions. Therefore, a spinoff will increase firm value when it leads to
an increase in information production about the undervalued part of the firm and/or when
it leads to a decrease in information production about the over valued part of the firm.
This implies that spinoffs can be motivated by both having undervalued assets and having
over valued ones. As mentioned earlier this can explain the recent empirical findings in
Allen(2001) which show that a spinoff can also occur when insiders have information that
a division is over valued.
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5.2 Liquidity Traders
Although our results are true for any level of z one element which is left un modeled in
the analysis is what determines where liquidity traders go when there are two traded stocks.
In other words what are the characteristics of the firm which attract liquidity traders? The
problem is that liquidity traders are inherently non strategic agents. Other studies which
have modeled strategic liquidity traders either assume that liquidity traders are subject to
exogenous endowment shocks and hence they trade for hedging reasons (see for example
Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)), or they assume that these traders are divided into
groups of discretionary and non discretionary liquidity traders (see for example Admati
and Pfleiderer(1988) and Subrahmanyam (1991)). Unfortunately, in our case both of these
modeling improvements do not provide any additional insight. If we assume that liquidity
traders trade for hedging reasons then clearly they would be better off trading in the two
single division firms. Thus, we would probably have that σ2u < σ2u1 + σ
2
u2 . However,
our equilibrium is determined by both (1) the difference σ2u − (σ2u1 + σ2u2) and (2) how
σu1 relates to σu2 . The problem then is that both (1) and (2) will be a function of the
utility of the liquidity traders and of their endowment shocks. Since both of these must be
given exogenously it is not clear that there is a benefit to adding this layer of complexity.
If we choose to go the route of dividing the liquidity traders into discretionary and non
discretionary traders then we would still have that σ2u = σ2u1 + σ
2
u2 so the equilibrium
will be determined by the relation between σu1 and σu2. This relation however will be
determined by the exogenous assumption regarding what firm characteristics attract the
non discretionary traders and what is the fraction of traders that are non discretionary.
Thus, again it is not clear whether this benefits our analysis.
For the above reasons we leave the liquidity traders as non strategic agents with the
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belief that the main results of our paper that: 1) organizational form matters for information
production and that 2)spinoffs can increase firm value due to either having an under valued
division or to having an over valued one, are robust to a more detailed description of these
agents.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the impact of organizational form on the incentive of market
participants to collect information about the future value of investments made by the firm.
We show that the incentive to collect information about a division depends on whether that
division is traded as a separate firm or whether it is traded as part of a multi division firm.
We show that in a multi division setting information collection regarding a specific division
is affected not only by the economic characteristics of that division but also by the relative
size and volatility of that division as they relate to the rest of the firm. We demonstrate
the implications of these results for the aggregate amount of information in the market and
for the value of the firm. Our analysis suggests that spinoffs do not always increase the
amount of information produced in the stock market and do not always increase firm value.
Whether a spinoff leads to an increase in information production and in firm value depends
on how similar are the Sharpe ratios of the investment sets of the two divisions.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 and 4
The proof is for Lemma 4. For a proof of Lemma 1 simply set αi = 0 and σu = σui to get
λj ,Xj and Pj . We look for a linear equilibrium where, given the two signals S1 and S2, the
market maker sets a price P = µ + λY where Y = X + U is the aggregate demand. The
two conditions that must be satisfied in equilibrium are:
(i) P = E{V |X + U}
(ii) X = argmaxxE{x(V − P )|S1, S2}.
Here, V = α1V1 + α2V2.
(i) is the condition that the market maker selects a price which gives him zero expected
profits and (ii) is the condition that the informed trader submits a demand which maximizes
her trading profits.
(i) and (ii) can be written as,
P = α1{µ1 + Cov(V1, Y )
σ2Y
(Y − µY )}+ α2{µ2 + Cov(V2, Y )
σ2Y




[α1E(V1|S1) + α2E(V2|S2)− µ]
respectively. If we denote the informed trader’s demand as X = a + b1S1 + b2S2 then we
have the following four equations:











P = µ+ λY (3)













































The solution to this set of equations is













































The final calculation of X(S1, S2) can be derived directly from the above equations and the
proof follows. ✷
Proof of Lemma 2 and Lemma 5
This is a proof of Lemma 5. To get the proof for Lemma 2 simply note that, π(e1, e2) =
π1(e1) + π2(e2) where πi(ei) = πM (ei, ej = 0) and where we replace σu with σui where
appropriate.
The informed traders expected revenue from trading prior to making the investment
decision in information production is,
πM (e1, e2) = E(E[X(V − P (Y ))|S1, S2]) = Cov(X,V )− λV ar(X).
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Now, Cov(X,V ) = α1b1σ21 + α2b2σ
2








s2 . Using the expressions
derived in Lemma 1 for λ, b1 and b2 the lemma follows. ✷




























−0.5 − c2e2 = 0














e2+Be2]0.5 = 1. The last equation can then be simplified to obtain eM2 . A similar
analysis will provide us with a solution to eM1 and the proof follows. ✷
Proof of Proposition 2 By definition the expected profit from a spinoff is equal to the




α1(es1 − eM1 )(V1 − µ1) +
1
2
α2(es1 − eM2 )(V2 − µ2)
Using equation 11 we have,











































3 ](V2 − µ2)























Now, define β∗(z) by the β for which β
4
β4+β−4 = z. Then for β > β
∗(z) the term in the first
square brackets is negative and the term in the second square brackets is positive. Thus,
the proof follows. ✷
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